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Introduction
Our increasing deployment of and reliance on robots means 
that there is a pressing need for a clear position on the 
possibility of developing robots that can be described as 
‘good’ or ‘ethical’. High proile concerns have been raised 
about the potential impact of artiicially intelligent systems 
on humans, and arguments have been made about the need 
to constrain the behaviour of such systems (e.g. Bostrom 
2014; Russell 2016). Two areas in which there is a grow-
ing awareness of the extent to which robotics can directly 
impinge on the health and safety of humans are those 
involving (i) autonomous vehicles and (ii) robotic weapons, 
especially ‘autonomous’ robot weapons. It is apparent that 
autonomous cars are likely to encounter situations in which 
it is necessary to make life or death decisions about whether 
to protect themselves, or other humans (Lin 2013, 2015). 
And autonomous robotic weapons could be deployed in sit-
uations in which they make decisions about when to use 
lethal force, and who to kill (Sharkey 2012; Asaro 2012; 
Altmann et al. 2013). The stakes in such domains are high, 
and the issues important.
Both self-driving cars, and lethal autonomous weapons, 
would directly afect the physical safety of human beings. 
But life or death decisions are not the only ways in which 
robots could afect human lives: their potential efects are 
not limited to physical damage. As discussed by Sharkey 
(2016), a robot deployed in a classroom as a teacher or as 
a teacher’s assistant, could be required to make decisions 
about what children’s behaviour was acceptable or punish-
able. A robot ‘carer’ of vulnerable older people might have 
to make decisions about which of its charge’s activities 
should be facilitated, or prevented (Sharkey and Sharkey 
2012; Sorrell and Draper 2014). Similarly, to be efective, 
a robot ‘nanny’ or minder of children would need to make 
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decisions about when to stop children from doing some-
thing, and when to encourage them (Sharkey and Sharkey 
2010).
If robots are to be placed in situations in which they will 
make decisions that have a direct impact on human well 
being, or on human physical safety, it is only sensible to 
try to ensure that they make the right decisions. The aim of 
this paper is to examine the various approaches that have 
been taken to answering the question about whether robots 
can be programmed to be good, and to assess their cur-
rent level of success. In doing so, any examples of actual 
implementations, as opposed to abstract discussions of 
what might be possible in principle, will be highlighted. 
This examination will form the basis for a consideration of 
the best response to the current situation, and a discussion 
of the circumstances in which robot use should be encour-
aged, discouraged, or even banned. This in turn will con-
tribute to the ongoing debate about what is meant by taking 
a ‘responsible’ approach to robotics.
Programming robots to be good
There have been various attempts to program robots to be 
‘good’ and to make decisions that might be described as 
ethical or moral. Famously, the science iction writer Isaac 
Asimov proposed the 3 laws of robotics (Asimov 1942)
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inac-
tion, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings 
except where such orders would conlict with the irst 
law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conlict with the irst or second 
laws.
However, many of Asimov’s stories illustrated the unin-
tended problems that could occur as a result of following 
these rules. The rules are of course ictional, and there is no 
simple way of translating them into implementable code. 
How could you write a program to ensure that a robot’s 
action or inaction did not lead to a human being coming 
to harm? How could the robot foresee all the possible con-
sequences of its actions, and their interaction with human 
behaviour? How could a robot even recognise harm? The 
rules seem more focused on short-term physical safety, 
when clearly there are other ways in which humans could 
be harmed. A robot’s actions might indirectly cause future 
long-term physical harm. Its actions could also lead to other 
kinds of damage such as psychological trauma or emotional 
upset. The rules also imply robots that can understand the 
orders given to them by humans (and the extent to which 
they conlict with the irst law). As Murphy and Woods 
(2009) point out, such robust natural language understand-
ing has not yet been achieved.
There have been some practical attempts to program 
robots to be ‘good’, or to make decisions that have been 
described as ethical. Winield et  al. (2014) report experi-
ments in which robots are programmed to stop other robots 
(designated as proxy humans) from coming to harm. The 
robot is placed in an environment in which it has a goal to 
reach, but in which there is also a ‘hole’ or dangerous area 
that is a risk both to it, and to the other proxy human robots. 
They propose an internal-modelling based architecture 
for what they describe as ‘a minimally ethical robot’. The 
robot has access to an internal model, or simulator, through 
which it can assess all possible actions by looking at their 
consequences: in particular their consequences in terms of 
the dangerous hole area. The robots used the internal model 
to anticipate the consequences of diferent trajectories of 
movement for themselves or other robots. These anticipated 
consequences, combined with pre-set preferences, are used 
as the basis for determining which action to undertake. 
Possible actions include moving towards (and falling in) 
the hole, or blocking the path of another robot (the proxy 
human) in order to prevent it from falling into the hole. The 
robot’s predetermined ‘preferences’ are set by the human 
programmer. Winield et al. (2014) describe a situation in 
which there are two proxy human robots, both of which 
are following a trajectory that would lead them to enter the 
dangerous area. The main actor robot is programmed to try 
to intercept the path of both robots, but given no way of 
prioritising which one to rescue irst. As a consequence, the 
robot was sometimes found to dither between two possible 
trajectories, as if it were unsure of which proxy human to 
save.
Winield et al. (2014, p. 5) write ‘What we have set out 
here appears to match remarkably well with Asimov’s irst 
law of robotics: A robot may not injure a human being or, 
through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm’. 
The work has stimulated discussion in the media (e.g. Rut-
kin 2014) of whether or not the robots should be described 
as ethical. However the robots in question have been pro-
grammed to behave as they do. Although they appear to 
hesitate about what to do when faced by the dilemma of two 
proxy human robots that both need rescuing, this hesitation 
is a consequence of their programming. One of the main 
reasons that this work has stimulated discussion is that it 
describes the main robot as being ‘minimally ethical’. This 
use of the term ‘ethical’ is controversial, as will be dis-
cussed later. Nonetheless a strength of the study is that it 
provides an implemented and practical example of research 
into issues related to robots and ethical decision-making.
Ron Arkin has argued that robots and computational 
agents could be more ethical and moral than lawed and 
emotional humans. In a paper about implementing an 
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‘ethical governor’ for autonomous military robots, he 
writes, ‘It is not my belief that an unmanned system will 
be able to be perfectly ethical in the battleield, but I am 
convinced that they can perform more ethically than human 
soldiers are capable of’ (Arkin 2007, p.  4). His reasons 
are: (i) the robots will not need to protect themselves and 
could be self-sacriicing; (ii) they might have better sensors 
for battleield observation than humans; (iii) they could 
be designed without emotions that could afect their judg-
ment; (iv) unlike humans, they would not be vulnerable to 
‘scenario fulillment’, and to interpreting a situation in the 
light of prior expectations; (v) they could integrate infor-
mation from several sources faster than humans can; (vi) 
they could independently monitor (and report) the behavior 
of those in the battleield.
The ethical governor proposed by Arkin et al. (2009) is 
part of a system architecture that is described as ‘poten-
tially capable of adhering to the International laws of war 
(LOW) and rules of engagement (ROE) to ensure that these 
systems conform to the legal requirements of a civilized 
nation’ (Arkin 2009, p. 1). The ethical governor would be 
introduced as a bottleneck to evaluate the actions proposed 
by the reasoning subsystems of the overall system, permit-
ting only those actions that were deemed ethically accept-
able. The acceptability of actions would be determined 
based on a set of constraints, which themselves would be 
based on stored representations of the International laws of 
war, and the speciic rules of engagement. Actions could be 
deemed unethical and prohibited if they did not conform to 
the laws of war, or if they were not recommended as appro-
priate, (‘obligated’ in their terminology). A further check 
would be carried out to ensure that potential collateral 
damage would be minimized, based on a table indicating 
acceptable levels of collateral damage given the military 
necessity associated with the target. Arkin (2009) describes 
an evaluation of the architecture undertaken within the 
MissionLab simulation environment, in which the deci-
sions made as a result of the interaction between the ethical 
governor and the behavioural control system are examined 
in a number of test scenarios. The simulated tests indicate 
that the system, together with the ethical governor, would 
make decisions about the use of lethal force that would 
limit collateral damage with reference to the levels of mili-
tary necessity (as determined by the military).
We could see the ethical governor as constituting an 
approach to programming robots ‘to be good’, or ethical. 
At the same time, autonomous military robots programmed 
in this way would have no choice about what actions they 
would perform. Their action choices, in this case about 
deploying lethal force, would be determined by the system 
and the set of constraints, which are set up and decided 
upon by the programmers and those using the system. As 
in Winield’s et al. (2014) experiments described above, the 
programmers of the system efectively determine the action 
choices.
A number of objections have been raised to Arkin’s pro-
posals. Matthias (2011) discusses the paper in detail, and 
points to a number of diiculties. One of these is that many 
of the rules on which the system is based are unclear and 
contradictory. For example, the rules of engagement for use 
in Kosovo stated “You may use minimum force, including 
opening ire, against an individual who unlawfully commits 
or is about to commit an act which endangers life, in cir-
cumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act” 
(Arkin 2007, p.  37, cited by Matthias). Adhering to this 
rule would require considerable interpretation, and knowl-
edge and understanding of individuals’ intentions. Matthias 
(2011) also points out that the military can adjust or over-
ride the ethical governor if military necessity is considered 
to be high, and that it should therefore be described as an 
ethical advisor, rather than as an ethical governor.
Matthias characterizes Arkin’s view of a moral agent as 
one that follows rules. The ethical governor performs its 
actions ‘according to a pre-installed program, with no pos-
sibility of dissent or of questioning the commands issued to 
it’ (Matthias 2011), unlike the case of a soldier who could 
refuse to carry out an immoral command. Crucially, it lacks 
the autonomy that Matthias considers to be ‘a key ingredi-
ent of moral agency’.
A similar objection could be made to the idea that Win-
ield’s robots are ‘minimally ethical’. Interestingly, in a 
recent paper, (Vanderelst and Winield 2016), the point is 
made that if a robot can be programmed to make ‘ethical’ 
choices, it can also be programmed to make ones that are 
‘unethical’. In a ‘shell game’, in which the desired action 
was either to approach the shell on the left or the right, 
Vanderelst and Winield (2016) used a robot that was able 
to detect whether or not another robot (again designated 
a proxy human) was moving towards the correct shell, 
or heading in the wrong direction. They programmed the 
robot to indicate to the human when they were heading in 
the wrong direction. They also programmed two other ver-
sions of the robot: a competitive version which headed to 
the goal irst and prevented the proxy human from reach-
ing it, and an ‘aggressive’ version that deceived the proxy 
human and sent it in the wrong direction. They conclude 
from their experiments that it is just as possible to program 
a robot to be unethical as it is to program it to be ethical.
Moor (2006) developed a typology of ethical agents, and 
it is interesting to consider how it would apply to Arkin’s 
‘ethical governor’, or to Winield’s ‘minimally ethical’ 
robots. Moor identiied and deined four types of moral 
agent: ethical impact agents, implicit ethical agents, explicit 
ethical agents and full ethical agents. Ethical impact agents 
are computers or robots that ‘do our bidding as surro-
gate agents and impact ethical decisions such as privacy, 
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property and power’ (ibid p. 19). Moor gives the example 
of the robot camel jockeys in Qattar that have reduced the 
use of young boys as slaves to ride the camels. Implicit eth-
ical agents, by contrast, act ethically because they are pro-
grammed, or have internal functions, which promote ethi-
cal behavior, or avoid unethical behavior. Moor gives the 
example of automatic teller machines (ATMs) that are pro-
grammed to deliver the right amount of money. An explicit 
ethical agent can ‘represent ethics explicitly and then oper-
ate efectively on the basis of this knowledge’ (ibid p. 20). 
A full ethical agent can both make ethical judgments and 
justify them. A human with consciousness, intentionality 
and free will is a full ethical agent. Moor points out that 
some would argue that computational artifacts (computers 
and robots) will never be full ethical agents whilst lack-
ing consciousness, intentionality and free will. He disputes 
this claim, on the basis that ‘we can’t say with certainty 
that future machines will lack these abilities’ (ibid p. 20). 
Rather than engaging in this debate, Moor argues that it is 
important to examine the other categories, and in particu-
lar to research the possibility of developing explicit ethical 
agents.
Moor wants to encourage eforts to develop explicit 
ethical agents because (i) we want machines to treat us 
well (ii) machines are becoming more powerful and need 
a more powerful ethics, and (iii) programming or teach-
ing ethics to a machine will increase our understanding of 
ethics. He suggests that a major barrier to creating explicit 
ethical agents will be their lack of common sense and world 
knowledge. For example, a robot could only refrain from 
harming humans if it had a good knowledge of what pos-
sible harms there were.
Arkin’s ethical governor could be considered to it in 
the Moor’s implicit ethical agent category since it contains 
internal ethical functions that promote ethical behavior. 
However its operation is more sophisticated than the ATMs 
that Moor ofers as an example of implicit ethical agents, 
since its assessments of possible actions are based on a 
combination of constraints (from Laws of War, and spe-
ciic Rules of Engagement) and considerations of collateral 
damage and military necessity. As such it might be consid-
ered to be an explicit ethical agent in Moor’s typology, even 
though its explicit representation of ethics takes the form of 
constraints speciic to military situations rather than more 
general ethical principles. However Moor seems to expect 
more of an explicit ethical agent, and wrote, in 2007, that 
‘an explicit ethical agent is futuristic at the moment’ (Moor 
2007, p. 12). His argument seems to be that explicit ethical 
agents are an appropriate goal to aim for, even though they 
may not be fully achieved. An explicit ethical agent should 
be one that ‘can identify and process ethical information 
about a variety of situations and make sensitive determina-
tions about what should be done in those situations’(ibid 
p. 12), working out resolutions when principles conlict. It 
should also be able to give persuasive justiications for its 
decisions. It is not clear that the ethical governor is able to 
do all of this. In particular, the range of situations to which 
it can be applied is limited to the battleield, and its deter-
minations are largely predetermined by the way it is set up.
The ‘minimally ethical’ robots of Winield et al. (2014), 
that can prevent other robots from entering an area des-
ignated as dangerous, are able to make judgments that 
Winield et  al. describe as ethical. As such they might be 
considered to be explicit ethical agents in Moor’s terms. 
However, their behavior is quite speciic to one situation, 
and they are not able to process information about a vari-
ety of situations. Nor are they able to ofer justiications for 
their decisions. Perhaps they, and Arkin’s ethical governor, 
would be better described as implicit ethical agents, more 
akin to the ATMs that Moor uses as an example.
Susan and Michael Anderson (Anderson and Anderson 
2007) also write about ethical agents, with the aim of devel-
oping an explicit ethical agent as deined by Moor (2006): 
able to represent particular ethical principals and to operate 
efectively on the basis of that representation. They contrast 
this with the idea of ad hoc programming of a machine to 
behave correctly in certain circumstances (implicit ethical 
agents). Interestingly, the Andersons make a distinction 
between moral responsibility, which implies intentionality 
and free will, and performing the morally correct action in 
a given situation.
The Andersons make use of an ethical theory based on 
prima facie duties (duties or obligations which individu-
als should try to satisfy but which could be overridden 
by stronger obligations), developed by Ross (1930). They 
(Anderson et al. 2006) use inductive logic programming to 
learn the relationships between these duties, which often 
give conlicting advice. Their work resides in the domain 
of medical ethics and is based on Beauchamp and Chil-
dress’s four principles of medical ethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress 1979): respect for autonomy, and the principles 
of beneicence, non-maleicence, and justice. The par-
ticular dilemma they focus on is one where a health-care 
worker has recommended a treatment for a competent 
adult patient, and the patient has rejected the treatment. 
Should the health care worker accept the patient’s decision, 
or attempt to change their mind? Anderson et  al. (2006) 
implemented a machine learning approach using inductive 
logic programming to learn the relationships between the 
principles and the two possible actions. The system (MedE-
thEx) has access to a representative set of cases in which 
humans have made ‘ethically correct’ decisions, and uses 
inductive logic to abstract ethical principles from them. 
They claim that the system discovered a new principle: ‘a 
health-care worker should challenge a patient’s decision if 
it isn’t fully autonomous and there’s either any violation of 
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non-maleicence or a severe violation of beneicence’, (ibid 
p.  1764). They have also implemented another version of 
the system, EthEl on a Nao robot that can decide whether 
or not to remind the patient to take the medicine, and 
whether or not to report the patient to an overseer for not 
taking the medicine. They admit that the system at present 
is limited, but suggest that it could be scaled up to make a 
wider range of ethical decisions.
A strength of the Andersons’ work, and that of Winield 
and his colleagues is that the decision mechanisms have 
been implemented and shown to work with actual robots. 
Nonetheless, the examples seem disappointingly limited in 
their scope: the implemented systems can only make ‘ethi-
cal’ decisions in quite speciic scenarios; either about pre-
venting others from entering a dangerous area, or deciding 
whether or not to insist a patient take their medicine. The 
ethical governor seems to have a wider scope of applica-
tion that covers varying battle scenarios, but in practice has 
only been tested in quite constrained simulations of mili-
tary situations.
Wallach and Allen (2009) in their book, ‘Moral 
Machines’, distinguish between top down and bottom up 
approaches to the development of Artiicial Moral Agents 
(AMAs). The approaches considered in this section are 
similar to their top down approach, which they deine as 
‘any approach that takes a speciic ethical theory and anal-
yses its computational requirement to guide the design of 
algorithms and subsystems capable of implementing that 
theory’ (pp.  80). The top-down approaches they discuss 
include that of the Andersons (Anderson et  al. 2006), but 
they focus more on the diiculty of getting a machine to 
apply the sets of moral principles that constitute deontolog-
ical or consequential ethics. Major problems with develop-
ing an ethical system for a robot-based utilitarian ethics lie 
in the need to anticipate the efects of undertaking action, 
and even more so in the need to evaluate the goodness or 
desirability of such efects. Any implementation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative raises another set of seemingly 
intractable problems (ibid pp. 95–97).
Wallach and Allen contrast this top down approach to 
a bottom up one, in which an emphasis is placed on ‘cre-
ating an environment where an agent explores courses of 
action and learns and is rewarded for behavior that is mor-
ally praiseworthy’ (ibid p. 80), with the idea that any ethi-
cal principles will be discovered or constructed, rather than 
imposed in a top down manner. As will become apparent in 
the next section, there have also been various attempts to 
train or evolve robots to be ethical.
Training robots to be ethical
Malle (2015) takes the approach of outlining what is 
required for moral competence, and considering how this 
could be achieved in robots. For him, the requirements for 
moral competence are: a moral vocabulary; a system of 
norms; moral cognition and afect; moral decision-making 
and action; and moral communication. A moral vocabu-
lary would include terms referring to norms (e.g. ‘fair-
ness’, ‘honesty’), their violations (e.g. ‘wrong’, ‘thief’), and 
responses to violations (e.g. ‘blame’, ‘forgiveness’). Knowl-
edge of such terms could help a robot detect when humans 
refer to morally signiicant situations. A system of norms 
forms the basis of morality in humans, and is built up over 
time, initially on the basis of the moral judgments that 
adults make about concrete behaviors: ‘that was naughty!’; 
‘He did something wrong’. Malle argues that it would not 
be possible to preprogram such norms into a robot since 
they are too subtle and context dependent. Instead he sug-
gests that, ‘a more promising direction is to mix unsuper-
vised and supervised learning, “practice” through constant 
browsing of existing data (e.g. novels, conversations, mov-
ies) along with feedback about inferences (e.g. through 
crowdsourcing of “inquiries” the robot can make) and 
teaching through interaction’ (Malle 2015, p. 9).
As well as discussing how norms could be acquired, 
Malle also considers how they could be represented in 
robots: suggesting a lexible network activated by fea-
tures of the environment. In humans, knowledge of norms 
forms the basis for moral judgments since it enables them 
to recognize when norms have been violated and to allo-
cate blame to responsible individuals, depending on the 
intentionality behind an act. A robot would need to be able 
to identify the aspects of an event that violated social and 
moral norms, via some mechanism that did not require 
comparison to every stored norm. Malle suggests that it 
would be able to do so even if it had no afect or emotion.
According to Malle, moral decision-making and action, 
a prominent component of human moral competence, 
would not necessarily require free will on the part of the 
robot, but rather the ability to receive blame and take it 
into account in its future actions. In human moral decision-
making, there is a tension between the human’s own goals 
and social-moral norms that is balanced by empathy for 
others. But Malle suggests that robots will have less need 
for empathy since they will not have a tendency for self-
ish behavior. At the same time, in order to be trusted by 
humans, robots might need to at least behave in a caring 
empathetic way towards others. Moral communication, the 
last component, is also required for moral competence so 
that moral judgments can be made, and moral decisions 
explained.
Malle’s (2015) paper provides a useful account of what 
might be required for moral competence in robots. He does 
not say that such competence has yet been achieved, nor 
does he suggest a timeline for it. However, he makes the 
argument that creating a morally competent robot would be 
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a good thing, since such robots ‘could be trustworthy and 
productive partners, caretakers, educators, and members of 
the human community’ (Malle 2015, p.  19). He suggests 
that if a robot was to become morally competent it should 
have some rights, and should not necessarily have to obey 
human commands. Controversially he suggests it should 
even be allowed to kill humans in certain circumstances. 
However his account of moral competence is an analysis of 
what would be required, not an implementation, and it does 
not provide any working simulations or examples of moral 
robots. How might the components of moral competence 
be acquired by robots? Malle and Scheutz (2014) suggest 
that it might be necessary to raise robots in human environ-
ments, since this ‘may be the only way to expose them to 
the wealth of human moral situations and communicative 
interactions’ (ibid p. 34).
Russell (2016) also advocates a related training method 
when he considers the possibility of super intelligent 
machines, and the need to ensure that their goals do not 
conlict with those of humans. He suggests that by fol-
lowing three principles this should be possible: (i) ‘the 
machine’s purpose must be ‘to maximize the realization of 
human values’ (ibid p.  59) (ii) the machine must be ‘ini-
tially uncertain about what those human values are’ (ibid 
p.  59) and (iii) the machine must ‘be able to learn about 
human values by observing the choices that we humans 
make’ (ibid p. 59). He suggests that Inverse Reinforcement 
learning could be used to allow the machine to infer human 
values from observations of human actions. He does admit 
that some humans would form poor role models, and that 
humans exhibit diverse sets of values. As well as directly 
observing human behavior, he also suggests that machines 
could be given access to ‘vast amounts of written and 
ilmed information about people doing things (and others 
reacting)’ (ibid p. 59).
Suggestions such as these, that robots could be trained 
or ‘raised’ to develop human values, tend to be made in 
very general terms. There are very few examples where 
some form of training or evolution has been used to train a 
robot, or a computer, to develop some aspect of moral com-
petence. Riedl and Harrison’s paper (Riedl and Harrison 
2015) is an exception that presents preliminary results from 
a study exploring the possibility of a machine learning the 
norms of moral behavior from stories. They describe their 
goal as being one of ensuring ‘value alignment’, which they 
deine as ‘a property of an intelligent agent indicating that 
it can only pursue goals that are beneicial to humans’ (ibid 
p. 1). They argue that rather than programming such values 
into a computational system, value alignment could be bet-
ter achieved by reading stories, and reverse engineering the 
values that underlie them. They admit that ‘how to extract 
sociocultural values from narratives and construct a value-
aligned reward system remains an open research problem’ 
(ibid p. 4), but report a study in which stories are generated 
via crowd sourcing that pertain to the situation and behav-
ior that they want their virtual agent to perform.
In their preliminary study, a plot graph is learnt from 
the generated stories, and then a trajectory tree is devel-
oped that indicates all legal transitions from one plot point 
to another. The story-reading agent receives a reward every 
time it performs an action in the environment that is a suc-
cessor of the current node in the trajectory tree, and a pun-
ishment for any action that is not a successor of the current 
node. The situation they consider is one in which an agent 
must acquire a drug to cure an illness and return home, in 
a scenario they term ‘Pharmacy World’. In this story world, 
the computer essentially learns to avoid the bad action of 
stealing the drugs instead of obtaining them by legitimate 
means as a result of the rewards associated with following 
the steps in the trajectory tree. They acknowledge that their 
system is some way from being one that could be scaled 
up for a system of general artiicial intelligence, and that 
it is dependent on the content of the generated stories. 
They suggest that a more general solution to value align-
ment could be achieved by using all the stories associated 
with a given culture, assuming that subversive texts will 
be washed out by those that conform to social and cultural 
norms.
Riedl and Harrison’s work provides an indication of how 
value alignment might be achieved by reading stories. At 
the same time, as with many of the examples considered 
so far, the actual progress towards this goal that is evident 
in their paper is extremely limited: One scenario, some 
automated learning, but also a dependence on human inter-
vention to select the scenario and to determine the reward 
schedule. The question of whether it would be at all practi-
cal to scale this up to a general system for learning moral 
value is not given a clear answer here.
Can robots be ethical?
As well as eforts to program, or to develop moral compe-
tence in robots and machines, another way of approaching 
the issue is to consider whether, or to what extent, robots 
could ever be full ethical agents. Peter Asaro’s (Asaro 
2006) contribution here is to reject any strict division 
between full moral agents and other agents. He proposes 
that ‘it will be helpful to think of moral agency as a con-
tinuum from amorality to fully autonomous morality.’ (ibid 
p. 11). He suggests that the simplest way of getting robots 
to make moral decisions would be for them to randomly 
choose between a number of alternatives. Or they could 
be programmed to make decisions on the basis of a set of 
moral principles instantiated in the form of rules. Or, at 
another level of sophistication, they could be programmed 
to learn such a set of principles, and even to evolve their 
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own ethical systems. None of these would mean that they 
should be considered to be fully autonomous moral agents. 
That, he argues, would require them to have further abili-
ties such as ‘consciousness, self-awareness, the ability to 
feel pain or fear death, relexive deliberation and evaluation 
of its own ethical system and moral judgments’ (ibid p. 11).
Wallach and Allen (2009) also divide up the space of 
artiicial moral agents (AMAs), distinguishing between 
‘operational morality’ and ‘functional morality’. Opera-
tionally moral systems depend on their designers and users 
for any moral signiicance, and have little autonomy or 
sensitivity to morally relevant facts. As machines become 
more sophisticated they may achieve ‘functional moral-
ity’, and have the capacity to assess and respond to moral 
challenges. The distinction between the two is not clear-
cut. They refer to two dimensions of AMA development: 
autonomy and ethical sensitivity. Systems corresponding 
to operational morality are lower in autonomy and ethical 
sensitivity than those corresponding to functional moral-
ity. The highest levels of autonomy and ethical sensitivity 
belong to systems with full moral agency, and Wallach and 
Allen (2009) are clear ‘that humanity does not have such 
a technology’. They seem uncertain whether or not it will 
in the future, although they state that there are no proven 
limits to the abilities of AMAs. They write that ‘whether 
computer understanding will ever be adequate to support 
full moral agency remains an open question’ (ibid p. 69).
John Sullins seems happier to accept the notion that 
robots could be full moral agents. He (Sullins 2006) claims 
that a robot can be a full moral agent if (i) the robot is ‘sig-
niicantly autonomous’ (ii) the robot’s behavior is inten-
tional and (iii) the robot is in a position of responsibil-
ity. His requirements for autonomy and intentionality are 
uncomplicated. By autonomous, Sullins means that the 
robot should not be under the direct control of a human, 
and that it should have a practical independent agency. 
For intentionality, he refers to behaviour that is ‘complex 
enough that one is forced to reply on standard folk psycho-
logical notions of predisposition or ‘intention’ to do good 
or harm’, (ibid p.  28) and where the interaction between 
the robot’s programming and the environment results in 
actions that are seemingly ‘deliberate and calculated’. Sul-
lins considers a robot to be a moral agent when it ‘behaves 
in such a way that we can only make sense of that behav-
iour by assuming it has responsibility to some other moral 
agent(s)’ (ibid p. 28). His argument is based on Floridi and 
Sanders (2004) and their assertion that when viewed at the 
appropriate level of abstraction an artiicial agent can be 
considered a moral agent. Sullins does not consider cur-
rent robots to be the moral equals of humans, but advocates 
paying attention to on-going developments in this area.
Johnson and Miller (2008), by contrast, do not con-
sider Floridi and Sanders’ arguments about levels of 
abstraction to be decisive. For them, there is ‘no pre-
existing right answer to the question whether computer 
systems are (or could ever be considered to be) moral 
agents; there is no truth to be uncovered, no test that 
involves identifying whether a system meets or does not 
meet a set of criteria’ (ibid p.  123); they write here of 
computer systems, but their discussions apply equally as 
well to robots. Instead they frame the debate as an argu-
ment between two distinct groups of scholars or research-
ers with diferent underlying motivations. The irst group 
they call ‘Computational Modelers’. They characterize 
Computational Modelers as being committed to estab-
lishing the validity of computational modeling. Those 
in the computational modeling camp believe that giving 
computer systems (or robots) the status of moral agents 
will further endorse the approach.
Johnson and Miller (ibid) distinguish the Computational 
Modelers from the ‘Computers-in-Society’ group. Accord-
ing to them, this group is against ascribing the status of 
moral agent to any computer system on the grounds that 
doing so is dangerous. It is dangerous because it distances 
human developers, owners, and users, from their respon-
sibility for the robots or computer systems that they have 
developed or deploy. For those in this group it is important 
to emphasize the connection between humans and the tech-
nology they develop.
Johnson (2006) also argued that computer systems (and 
robots) should be viewed as moral entities, but not as moral 
agents. Her argument is extensive and based on the idea 
that, although the actions of computer systems can have 
moral consequences, these necessarily involve the inten-
tions of humans. A computer system does not have the 
same freedom to act based on intentions that humans have. 
She gives the example of a landmine, which once placed in 
the ield, is distant from the humans who designed and built 
it, and from those who placed it there. The landmine will 
be triggered when stepped on. Nonetheless, the landmine is 
only there as the result of human activity, and the humans 
involved in its deployment are morally responsible. Even 
if the landmine were replaced by something more sophis-
ticated that made a decision about whether or not to deto-
nate based on an assessment of the surrounding situation, 
humans would still be implicated in developing the rules 
that determine that decision. For Johnson, the artifact itself, 
the artifact designer, and the artifact user, together form a 
moral entity that can be morally evaluated. A related argu-
ment is made by Hew (2014), who argues that ‘For an arti-
icial agent to be morally praiseworthy, its rules for behav-
ior and the mechanisms for supplying those rules must not 
be supplied entirely by external humans’ (ibid p. 197). He 
claims that this is not technologically feasible for foresee-
able artiicial agents, and that systems based on technolo-
gies such as machine learning, evolutionary computing and 
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self- organisation are all dependent on rules supplied by 
humans.
Johnson and Miller’s argument rings true to the present 
author, and provides some explanation of the reasons why 
some writers and researchers are keen to believe that robots 
are, or could become, full moral agents, and why some are 
against the idea. In a similar way, there are those who insist 
that there is no in principle reason why it should not be 
possible one day to build robots that can feel pain and have 
emotions. And there are those who do not believe in  this 
possibility. It does seem to come down to a belief, since 
there is certainly little in the way of tangible evidence that 
this will ever happen.
One reason for being skeptical about the likelihood that 
non-living, non-biological machines could develop a sense 
of morality at some point in the future is their lack of a 
biological substrate. A case can be made for the ground-
ing of morality in biology. For instance, Churchland (2011) 
argues that morality in humans and mammals depends on 
their biology and is grounded in their ability to care for kith 
and kin; their recognition of other’s psychological states; 
problem solving in a social context; and learning social 
practices. The basis for caring, she writes, lies in the neuro-
chemistry of attachment and bonding in mammals. Humans 
and other mammals extend their self-maintenance and 
avoidance of pain in mammals to their immediate kin; feel-
ing ‘anxious and awful’ when either their own well-being is 
threatened, or the well-being of their loved ones. They also 
feel pleasure when their infants are safe, and when they are 
in the company of others. These emotions form the basis for 
more complex social relationships, grounded in the reward-
ing pleasures of approval and belonging, and the ‘general-
ised pain of shunning and disapproval’ (Churchland 2011, 
p. 131), and the internalization of social standards.
An argument for a biological basis for morality implies 
that existing robots lack the biological basis for the devel-
opment of morality. Current robots, lacking living bodies, 
cannot feel pain, or even care about themselves, let alone 
extend that concern to others. How can they empathise with 
a human’s pain or distress if they are unable to experience 
either emotion? Similarly, without the ability to experience 
guilt or regret, how could they relect on the efects of their 
actions, modify their behavior, and build their own moral 
framework?
How crucial are emotions and empathy for the develop-
ment of morality? Docherty (2016) has argued that robots 
should not be allowed to make an autonomous kill deci-
sion in battle because they lack both empathy and emotion. 
Robots, she claims ‘lack real emotions, including com-
passion’, and ‘could not truly understand the value of any 
human life they chose to take’. By contrast, because they 
possess empathy, ‘people can feel the emotional weight of 
harming another individual’, and refrain from unjustiied 
killing. She argues that humans are able to make the judg-
ments about proportionality that are required by the laws of 
war. Humans can apply judgment based on their past expe-
rience and moral consideration to assess the necessity of an 
attack, but Docherty thinks it unlikely that robots could be 
preprogrammed to do so, or that they would be able to rea-
son about unanticipated scenarios.
Docherty (2016) describes robots and robot weapons as 
lacking both emotions and empathy. However Prinz (2011) 
questions the extent to which empathy is required for 
morality, and claims that empathy itself is not very motivat-
ing, and that it is subject to bias. According to Prinz, empa-
thy is not necessary for making moral judgments, or for 
moral development, or for motivating moral conduct. Sen-
timents such as disapprobation, or emotions such as anger 
are more likely to form the basis for moral judgments about 
ofensive behavior. The point is sometimes made that psy-
chopaths lack empathy, and that they are also deicient in 
moral reasoning. But, as Prinz points out, psychopaths are 
also characterized by other emotional deiciencies, such as 
a low level of guilt, and an indiference to punishment, and 
their lack of empathy does not demonstrate its necessity for 
morality. Prinz’s arguments rest on the careful distinctions 
he makes between empathy and emotions. Nonetheless, 
Prinz (2011) is clear that moral judgment, moral develop-
ment and moral motivation do require emotions. And his 
discussion about the role of empathy does not refute the 
arguments made by Docherty (2016), since her objections 
to robots making life or death decision are primarily based 
on their general lack of emotions in general, and their ina-
bility to understand the value of human life.
Responding to the current situation
In the research we have looked at here, there is general 
agreement that current robots are not yet full moral agents. 
There is some disagreement about whether they could ever 
become so in the future. The situation is complicated by 
developments in robotics that make it increasingly possible 
to develop robots that look and behave in ways that cre-
ate and encourage the illusion that they are able to under-
stand and relate to humans. There is also a strong tendency 
to use terms to describe robots and computational agents 
that strongly imply that they are already ethical beings and 
moral agents.
Van Wynsberghe (2016) expresses her concern ‘that 
robots are being built with at least the appearance of moral 
agency and that they are being placed into inherently ethi-
cal contexts’, (ibid p. 313), and argues that such robots (in 
her case, service robots) demand ethical evaluation and 
relection. She is also concerned about the use of ethically 
charged words (e.g. trusting, emotional attachment, social-
ising) to describe robots and their behaviour.
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Noel Sharkey expresses similar concerns (Sharkey 
2012) when he writes about the application of ethical 
terms to robots and machines. He talks about the way in 
which applying terms such as ‘ethical’ or ‘humane’ to 
machines leads to false attributions of abilities to them: 
‘They act as linguistic Trojan horses that smuggle in a 
rich interconnected web of human concepts that are not 
part of a computer system or how it operates. Once the 
reader has accepted a seemingly innocent Trojan term 
…. it opens the gate to other meanings associated with 
the natural language use of the term’ (ibid p.  793). For 
instance, when Arkin writes that robots ‘can be more 
humane in the battleield than humans’ (Arkin 2009, 
p.  30), his language implies that robots are capable of 
kindness, mercy and compassion.
Miller et al. (2016) were disturbed by the use of the word 
‘ethical’ to describe the hole-rescuing robots of Winield 
et  al. (2014), and by the subsequent journalistic reporting 
of the study in the New Scientist by Rutkin (2014). As well 
as pointing out that inaccurately describing robot behav-
iour as ethical decision making is ‘more likely to confuse 
than educate’, (Miller et al. 2016, p. 392) they also set out 
some requirements for ethical decision making. They pro-
pose that ethical decision-making requires an ‘openness to 
self-doubt’ that they term an ‘elenchus experience’ with 
reference to Reed, (2013). They argue that for a machine 
to be considered to be capable of ethical decision-making, 
it needs to have ‘(i) a capacity to sense some aspects of the 
outside world (ii) an implementation of a function of merit 
that quantiies the acceptability of the current situation and 
(iii) a capacity to reprogram itself in order to improve per-
formance in future situations.’ (Miller et al. 2016, p. 393).
The elenchus experience of a machine may not be the 
same as a human elenchus experience. But according to 
Miller et al. (2016), if the machine or robot cannot recon-
sider a decision after it has been made in order to lead to 
better decision making in the future, it should not be con-
sidered to have made an ethical decision. To be described 
as ethical, a machine should be developing, or trying to 
develop, ethical expertise.
Miller et al. (2016) apply this deinition of ethical deci-
sion making to the hole avoiding robots described by Win-
ield et al. (2014), pointing out that the robots cannot recon-
sider their actions given their efects, and cannot reprogram 
or adjust them in order to achieve a better outcome in the 
future. Winield’s robots have no ability to maintain a 
record of past decisions and their outcomes, or to relect on 
these. The ‘decisions’ made by the robots are clearly the 
result of their programming, as we have already discussed. 
Miller et  al. argue that terms such as ‘ethical’ should not 
be used without better justiication to describe the apparent 
behaviour of a robot. Instead any description should be ‘as 
simple as possible, making as few assumptions as possible 
about the capabilities of the AA [artiicial agent]’(Miller 
et al. 2016, p. 400).
Of course, if robots are to be used in  situations that 
impinge on humans, it is important to take steps to ensure 
that they will not harm them. But given these points about 
the misuse of ethically charged words, perhaps the robot 
programming undertaken by Winield would be better 
described as addressing safety concerns, rather than as cre-
ating ‘minimally ethical robots’. Similarly, the Andersons 
describe their systems as involving explicit ethical agents, 
but their work might be better, and more prosaically, 
described as being about patient reminders. In the case of 
Arkin’s ethical governor, which involves harm to humans, 
perhaps his system would be better described as a military 
situation advisor.
An important reason for being careful about the use of 
language to describe the operations and underlying mecha-
nisms of robots and computers is the need to remain aware 
of the unavoidable human involvement and responsibility 
highlighted by some (Johnson 2006; Johnson and Miller 
2008; Hew 2014). As Johnson (2006) convincingly argues, 
even if a computational artefact is placed in a situation in 
which it is required to make decisions with moral conse-
quences, the responsibility for such decisions still rests 
with the humans and the society that developed them and 
decided to deploy them there. Describing such machines 
as being moral, ethical, or humane, risks increasing the 
tendency for humans to fail to acknowledge their ultimate 
responsibility for the actions of these artefacts. It could 
encourage the use of inappropriate use of machines to 
make morally sensitive decisions that afect humans when 
they lack the moral competence that such decisions require.
An important component of undertaking a responsible 
approach to the deployment of robots in sensitive areas 
then is to avoid the careless application of words and terms 
used to describe human behaviour and decision making 
to robots. If those writing about robots were to eschew, or 
at least limit, the use of terms such as ‘moral’, ‘ethical’, 
‘humane’, and ‘caring’ in their accounts, it would be easier 
to clearly assess their current abilities.
It is relevant at this point to question here the diference 
between the idea of robots making decisions in circum-
stances that require moral competence, and our increasing 
reliance on automatic and algorithmic decision-making. 
There are many crucial issues about this reliance that need 
to be addressed but that are beyond the scope of the pre-
sent article (see Carr 2015; Susskind and Susskind 2015). 
However there are some important diferences between the 
uses of robots in social roles, and the use of non-embodied 
computational systems. The robot in the classroom, or the 
robot on the battleield, may be required to make decisions 
that require an understanding of the surrounding human 
social context. The inputs to its decision-making would be 
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based on the information gathered from its sensors, and on 
its interpretation of the social meaning of that information. 
This is quite diferent from a medical decision maker or 
advisor that is fed information of-line, and that does not 
have to rely on real-time interpretation of a social situa-
tion. Circumstances that require morally competent deci-
sion makers are those for which there is some ambiguity, 
and a need for a contextual understanding: situations in 
which judgment is required and there is not a single correct 
answer.
The idea that the circumstances in which morally com-
petent decision makers are required are those in which 
there is some ambiguity about what the right decision is 
raises some questions about some of the examples we have 
considered here that are described as requiring ethical deci-
sions. Moor (2006) described an ATM that dispenses the 
right amount of money as an implicit ethical agent: but is 
there any ambiguity here about whether or not the right 
amount of money should be dispensed? Likewise, when 
a robot prevents a proxy human robot from falling into a 
hole, is this an ethical, or a safety decision? Is the auto-pilot 
of an aeroplane making ethical decisions when it over-
sees a smooth take-of and landing? None of these exam-
ples involve the interpretation of a human social situation: 
instead they involve an understanding of the physical sur-
roundings (in the case of hole-avoidance and lying), or of 
accurate data checking (in the case of the ATM). The situa-
tions that require a morally competent decision maker seem 
diferent to these.
Given these deliberations, and given what seems to 
be a general agreement that robots are not yet full moral 
agents, we turn now to a consideration of what would be 
the responsible way to respond. There seem to be two main 
alternative responses. Response 1 advocates the need to 
work towards the development of robots that have some 
level of ethical ability. Response 2 is to make eforts to pre-
vent or dissuade people from deploying robots in situations 
and roles in which moral decisions are required. We will 
examine and evaluate both of these responses in turn.
Response 1: building ‘ethical’ robots
There are some authors who consider it both important, and 
possible, to develop robots and machines with some degree 
of ethical behaviour. For instance, Wallach (2010) advo-
cates the building of ‘moral machines’ as a practical goal, 
motivated by ‘the need to ensure that increasingly autono-
mous machines will not cause harm to humans and other 
entities worthy of moral consideration’ (ibid p.  243). He 
suggests that artiicial moral agents (AMAs) will continue 
to be developed for practical applications over a long period 
of time, and that testing these systems will enable an under-
standing of the limits of the implemented mechanisms. For 
instance, he proposes that the limitations of a system that 
lacks speciic mechanisms such as emotions, a theory of 
mind, or consciousness will become apparent to engineers 
when they are tested and found not to be ‘suiciently sensi-
tive to moral considerations essential for making judgments 
in certain situations’.
The idea that the limitations of such systems should 
be found by testing them seems unconvincing to the pre-
sent author. Apart from anything else, the developer of 
an AMA is likely to be more concerned with showing its 
strengths than in inding its limitations. The limitations of 
a given system or robot, or of robots in general, are also 
usually easily identiiable without the need for actual test-
ing. For example, Winield’s robots are able to prevent 
other robots from falling into a hole. But it would make lit-
tle sense to test the robots to see if they were able to pre-
vent other robots from, for instance, running out of energy, 
because that is not what they were programmed to do. It 
also seems unnecessary to actually build a childcare robot 
without phenomenal consciousness or emotions in order to 
demonstrate that the children left in its care for long peri-
ods start to exhibit dysfunctional behaviour and attachment 
problems. The question of whether or not robot Nannies 
are a good idea is one that can be considered and answered 
on the basis of knowledge about the current abilities of 
robots; it doesn’t need a practical (and potentially risky) 
demonstration.
Moor (2006) was also, as we have seen, keen on the idea 
of developing ethical agents even if they always fall short 
of what is needed for a full ethical agent. He argued that 
it is important to examine the other types of moral agent 
he identiied (ethical impact agents, implicit ethical agents 
and explicit ethical agents), and especially encouraged the 
development of explicit ethical agents because of the need 
to ensure that ‘machines treat us well’. He also conjectured 
that programming or teaching ethics to a machine would 
improve our understanding of ethics.
Our understanding of ethics is indeed likely to be 
improved as a consequence of attempts to teach or program 
ethics into machines. This is also the case in many other 
domains of computational modeling where improvements 
in understanding have been gained as a result of having 
to be more explicit about the assumed underlying mecha-
nisms. However, if we look at the current state of AMAs 
and ‘minimally ethical’ robots, and compare it to what is 
known about human moral abilities there seems to be an 
insurmountable gap between the two. As reported earlier, 
Malle (2015) provided a useful outline of what is required 
for moral competence (a moral vocabulary; a system of 
norms; moral cognition and afect; moral decision-making 
and action; and moral communication). There is no evi-
dence of an artiicial system that has come any way close 
to achieving such competence. In addition, the systems 
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that have been developed to date are all severely limited in 
scope to a particular domain.
Despite the current level of progress and achievements 
in this area, there are still those who continue to advocate 
the deployment of robots in situations in which moral deci-
sion-making will be required. For example, Arkin (2009) 
has argued that robots will be able to make more ethical 
decisions in the fog of war than humans. When it is pointed 
out that current systems do not have suicient understand-
ing of the human situation and context, the argument is 
sometimes made that there is no reason in principle to 
expect that they will not be able to develop this, and that 
given time, they will.
Response 2: limiting robot use
While some like to believe that at some time in the future 
robots and machines will become sentient, conscious, 
and able to understand the human world, there are others 
(including the present author) who prefer to focus instead 
on their actual capabilities. Currently existing robots are 
neither sentient or conscious, nor capable of understand-
ing the complexities of social situations involving humans. 
They are also unlikely to become so in the near future: a 
statement that cannot be proved, but for which there is little 
convincing counter evidence. Given this, it is argued here 
that the responsible approach should be to identify those 
situations in which robots should not be deployed, and the 
social roles that they should not be given. This again is the 
contention of the present author.
There are other writers who are beginning to suggest 
this. Most prominent are those who are writing about the 
use of robots in warfare, and arguing against the deploy-
ment of lethal autonomous weapons, where the robot, 
machine, or weapon, makes ‘decisions’ about who to kill 
without human supervision. For example, Christof Heyns 
(2013), the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, sum-
mary or arbitrary executions has argued that robots should 
not be allowed to make lethal decisions on the battleield, 
on the basis that they lack ‘human judgment, common 
sense, appreciation of the larger picture, understanding of 
the intentions behind people’s actions, and understand-
ing of the values and anticipation of the direction in which 
events are unfolding’ (2013, A/HRC/23/47).
Similar concerns have also been raised about the use of 
robots by the police (Sharkey 2016). Then there are authors 
who have looked at the use of robots for the care of older 
people (Sharkey and Sharkey 2012; Sparrow and Sparrow 
2006; Coeckelberg 2010; Vallor 2011), and raised concerns 
about the extent to which robots can care for and respond to 
them in the way that human carers do. Likewise, concerns 
have been raised about the use of robots as nannies, car-
ers, and teachers of children (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010; 
Sharkey 2016). In a similar vein, Sherry Turkle has writ-
ten persuasively about her concerns about people develop-
ing and being encouraged to develop, relationships with 
computational artifacts that ‘cannot love you back’ (Turkle 
2011).
Robots that are tasked with killing people are clearly 
treading on ethical territory. It is less obvious that this 
is the case for robots that are developed for the care and 
supervision of children, older people, or as companions. 
But how could a robot make appropriate decisions about 
when to praise a child, or when to restrict his or her activi-
ties, without a moral understanding? Similarly how could 
a robot provide good care for an older person without an 
understanding of their needs, and of the efects of its 
actions? Even a bar-tending robot might be placed in a situ-
ation in which decisions have to be made about who should 
or should not be served, and what is and is not acceptable 
behaviour. All of these seem to the present author to require 
both moral understanding and moral competence.
Saying that there are some situations in which robots 
should not be used is not the same as being overly negative 
about robot use. There are many situations in which robots 
can ofer people something that would not otherwise be 
available (Sharkey 2014). The challenge is to ind the right 
path to steer between capitalising on and beneitting from 
the unique opportunities that robots can ofer, and avoiding 
a future in which robots are placed in positions and roles 
that require a moral understanding that they do not have.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the progress made towards 
developing moral robots. We have seen how some have 
taken the route of attempting to program robots to be good. 
Others have proposed training, or raising, robots to develop 
moral understanding, or moral competence. The progress 
along both roads has been limited. Systems that have been 
either programmed or trained have so far been successfully 
applied only in quite narrow and speciic domains.
We have considered some of the debates about the extent 
to which robots could ever be full moral agents. There are 
those who are skeptical about the possibility that robots 
could ever be said to be moral. Nonetheless, there are sev-
eral writers (Asaro 2006; Moor 2006; and; Wallach and 
Allen 2009) who have looked at the possibility of devel-
oping robots, which, while not being full ethical agents, 
exhibit some level of ethicality. For instance, Moor dis-
tinguishes between ethical impact agents, implicit ethical 
agents, explicit ethical agents and full ethical agents.
The need to limit the unjustiied use of terms such as 
moral and ethical to robots has been highlighted here. The 
circumstances in which morally competent decision-makers 
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are needed have also been discussed. In addition, in the 
light of the current progress, (or lack of progress) towards 
the development of robots that are full moral agents, or 
explicit ethical agents able to reason about, and relect on 
their decisions, two responses to the current situation are 
identiied here: (1) building ‘ethical’ robots and (2) limiting 
robot use.
Those advocating the irst response who are interested 
in working towards the development of ‘minimally ethical’ 
robots, or explicit ethical agents, do not necessarily fall in 
the camp identiied by Johnson and Miller (2008) as ‘Com-
putational Modellers’. Indeed, they are often motivated by 
the need to ensure the safety of humans as robots increas-
ingly work near them, or with them, or are even placed in 
charge of them. An advantage of this response is that it 
is likely to advance our understanding of moral decision 
making in general, even if the ultimate goal of an artiicial 
moral agent is never achieved. However it is argued here 
that their work could often be better described as having 
the goal of developing safe robots, than as developing ethi-
cal robots.
Those commending the second response of Limit-
ing robot use, are likely to feel an ainity with others in 
the Computers-in-Society group identiied by Johnson and 
Miller (ibid). Given the gap between current robot abilities, 
and those required for full moral agency, it is important to 
recognise that humans remain responsible for any deploy-
ments of robots in morally sensitive domains. Humans 
should not oload their responsibility for the efects of 
robot actions onto the robots that carry them out. It is also 
crucial that, recognising this responsibility, steps are taken 
to anticipate the potential negative efects of placing robots 
in  situations where moral decisions are required, and that 
eforts are made to restrict their use. Appropriately devel-
oped and deployed robots have the potential to bring many 
beneits to human society, but the responsible robotics 
approach should have the aim of limiting their incursions 
into morally sensitive situations before it is too late.
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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give 
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a 
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were 
made.
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